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Title: SAFEGUARDS ENVELOPE: PREVIOUS WORK AND EXAMPLES

Abstract

The future expansion of nuclear power will require not just electricity production but fuel cycle facilities such as fuel fabrication and reprocessing plants. As large reprocessing facilities are built in various states, they must be built and operated in a manner to minimize the risk of nuclear proliferation. Process monitoring has returned to the spotlight as an added measure that can increase confidence in the safeguards of special nuclear material (SNM). Process monitoring can be demonstrated to lengthen the allowable inventory period by reducing accountancy requirements, and to reduce the false positive indications. The next logical step is the creation of a Safeguards Envelope, a set of operational parameters and models to maximize anomaly detection and inventory period by process monitoring while minimizing operator impact and false positive rates. A brief example of a rudimentary Safeguards Envelope is presented, and shown to detect synthetic diversions overlaying a measured processing plant data set. This demonstration Safeguards Envelope is shown to increase the confidence that no SNM has been diverted with minimal operator impact, even though it is based on an information sparse environment. While the foundation on which a full Safeguards Envelope can be built has been presented in historical demonstrationsmore » of process monitoring, several requirements remain yet unfulfilled. Future work will require reprocessing plant transient models, inclusion of “non-traditional” operating data, and exploration of new methods of identifying subtle events in transient processes.« less

Authors:
; ; ;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Idaho National Laboratory (INL)
Sponsoring Org.:
DOE - NE
OSTI Identifier:
944212
Report Number(s):
INL/CON-08-14405
TRN: US0900531
DOE Contract Number:  
DE-AC07-99ID-13727
Resource Type:
Conference
Resource Relation:
Conference: 49th Annual Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Conference,Nashville, TN,07/13/2008,07/17/2008
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS; 12 MGMT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE WASTES FROM NUCLEAR FACILITIES; 98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; DETECTION; ELECTRICITY; EXPLORATION; FABRICATION; FUEL CYCLE; MONITORING; NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT; NUCLEAR POWER; PROCESSING; PRODUCTION; PROLIFERATION; REPROCESSING; SAFEGUARDS; TRANSIENTS; nuclear reprocessing; process monitoring; safeguards; safeguards by design; safeguards envelope; statistics

Citation Formats

Richard Metcalf, Aaron Bevill, William Charlton, and Robert Bean. SAFEGUARDS ENVELOPE: PREVIOUS WORK AND EXAMPLES. United States: N. p., 2008. Web.
Richard Metcalf, Aaron Bevill, William Charlton, & Robert Bean. SAFEGUARDS ENVELOPE: PREVIOUS WORK AND EXAMPLES. United States.
Richard Metcalf, Aaron Bevill, William Charlton, and Robert Bean. Tue . "SAFEGUARDS ENVELOPE: PREVIOUS WORK AND EXAMPLES". United States. doi:. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/944212.
@article{osti_944212,
title = {SAFEGUARDS ENVELOPE: PREVIOUS WORK AND EXAMPLES},
author = {Richard Metcalf and Aaron Bevill and William Charlton and Robert Bean},
abstractNote = {The future expansion of nuclear power will require not just electricity production but fuel cycle facilities such as fuel fabrication and reprocessing plants. As large reprocessing facilities are built in various states, they must be built and operated in a manner to minimize the risk of nuclear proliferation. Process monitoring has returned to the spotlight as an added measure that can increase confidence in the safeguards of special nuclear material (SNM). Process monitoring can be demonstrated to lengthen the allowable inventory period by reducing accountancy requirements, and to reduce the false positive indications. The next logical step is the creation of a Safeguards Envelope, a set of operational parameters and models to maximize anomaly detection and inventory period by process monitoring while minimizing operator impact and false positive rates. A brief example of a rudimentary Safeguards Envelope is presented, and shown to detect synthetic diversions overlaying a measured processing plant data set. This demonstration Safeguards Envelope is shown to increase the confidence that no SNM has been diverted with minimal operator impact, even though it is based on an information sparse environment. While the foundation on which a full Safeguards Envelope can be built has been presented in historical demonstrations of process monitoring, several requirements remain yet unfulfilled. Future work will require reprocessing plant transient models, inclusion of “non-traditional” operating data, and exploration of new methods of identifying subtle events in transient processes.},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Tue Jul 01 00:00:00 EDT 2008},
month = {Tue Jul 01 00:00:00 EDT 2008}
}

Conference:
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