skip to main content
OSTI.GOV title logo U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Scientific and Technical Information

Title: ERCOT Event on February 26, 2008: Lessons Learned

Abstract

The event analyzed in this paper is of special interest, and was widely reported on in the press, because wind generation played a partial role in the event.

Authors:
;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
National Renewable Energy Lab. (NREL), Golden, CO (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE
OSTI Identifier:
935114
Report Number(s):
NREL/TP-500-43373
TRN: US200815%%307
DOE Contract Number:
AC36-99-GO10337
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
17 WIND ENERGY; TEXAS; POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS; FREQUENCY CONTROL; WIND POWER PLANTS; LOAD ANALYSIS; WIND ENERGY; UTILITIES; ERCOT; SYSTEM INTEGRATION; WIND POWER; WIND INTEGRATION; Wind Energy

Citation Formats

Ela, E., and Kirby, B. ERCOT Event on February 26, 2008: Lessons Learned. United States: N. p., 2008. Web. doi:10.2172/935114.
Ela, E., & Kirby, B. ERCOT Event on February 26, 2008: Lessons Learned. United States. doi:10.2172/935114.
Ela, E., and Kirby, B. Tue . "ERCOT Event on February 26, 2008: Lessons Learned". United States. doi:10.2172/935114. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/935114.
@article{osti_935114,
title = {ERCOT Event on February 26, 2008: Lessons Learned},
author = {Ela, E. and Kirby, B.},
abstractNote = {The event analyzed in this paper is of special interest, and was widely reported on in the press, because wind generation played a partial role in the event.},
doi = {10.2172/935114},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Tue Jul 01 00:00:00 EDT 2008},
month = {Tue Jul 01 00:00:00 EDT 2008}
}

Technical Report:

Save / Share:
  • This report summarizes the event which occured on February 26, 2008, in which the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) called for an Emergency Electric Curtailment Plan (EECP) at 18:41 due to a worsening imbalance between generation and load which led to a decline in system frequency. The event is of special interest, and was widely reported on in the press, because wind generation played a partial role in the event. Other load-response events, which did not involve wind generation, have not received similar attention.
  • This document summarizes what has been learned from generation of hydrogen in the reactor core and the hydrogen burn that occurred in the containment building of the Three Mile Island Unit No. 2 (TMI-2) nuclear power plant on March 28, 1979. During the TMI-2 loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), a large quantity of hydrogen was generated by a zirconium-water reaction. The hydrogen burn that occurred 9 h and 50 min after the initiation of the TMI-2 accident went essentially unnoticed for the first few days. Even through the burn increased the containment gas temperature and pressure to 1200/sup 0/F (650/sup 0/C) andmore » 29 lb/in/sup 2/ (200 kPa) gage, there was no serious threat to the containment building. The processes, rates, and quantities of hydrogen gas generated and removed during and following the LOCA are described in this report. In addition, the methods which were used to define the conditions that existed in the containment building before, during, and after the hydrogen burn are described. The results of data evaluations and engineering calculations are presented to show the pressure and temperature histories of the atmosphere in various containment segments during and after the burn. Material and equipment in reactor containment buildings can be protected from burn damage by the use of relatively simple enclosures or insulation.« less
  • This document summarizes what has been learned from generation of hydrogen in the reactor core and the hydrogen burn that occurred in the containment building of the Three Mile Island Unit No. 2 (TMI-2) nuclear power plant on March 28, 1979. During the TMI-2 loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), a large quantity of hydrogen was generated by a zirconium-water reaction. The hydrogen burn that occurred 9 h and 50 min after the initiation of the TMI-2 accident went essentially unnoticed for the first few days. Even though the burn increased the containment gas temperature and pressure to 1200/sup 0/F (650/sup 0/C) andmore » 29 lb/in/sup 2/ (200 kPa) gage, there was no serious threat to the containment building. The processes, rates, and quantities of hydrogen gas generated and removed during and following the LOCA are described in this report. In addition, the methods which were used to define the conditions that existed in the containment building before, during, and after the hydrogen burn are described. The results of data evaluations and engineering calculations are presented to show the pressure and temperature histories of the atmosphere in various containment segments during and after the burn. 51 refs.« less
  • This report chronicles the how and why of the key BSC Building America outcomes. It is organized and put in the context of what the Building Science Consortium has learned from and with its building industry partners.
  • Over the past 5 years under the Building America program, the Building Science Consortium has worked with more than 25 builders in 121 developments, in 18 states, and in all six climate zones. This work has resulted in more than 7,000 ENERGY STAR(TM) homes built as of August 2002.