Proliferation resistance of advanced sustainable nuclear fuel cycles.
As concluded by many global energy system analysts, hundreds of reactors will be burning recycled fuel as they supply a significant fraction of the world energy for this century and beyond. An expanding world population and rising expectations of citizens of emerging economies will stimulate a global energy demand that can only be met if nuclear makes up a significant fraction of the supply mix. Restrictions on carbon emissions will only add urgency to reducing reliance on fossil-fueled power plants. Just as today's commercial nuclear technology was introduced in the 1960s and 1970s, introduction of a new generation of nuclear plants will have to begin within the next two decades. In addition to being economically competitive, robustly safe, efficiently using natural resources and responsibly managing the radioactive waste, the next generation of nuclear energy systems will have to successfully allay legitimate concerns about their potential misuse in nuclear weapons material production. With large-scale deployment requiring the introduction of fuel recycling facilities as well as the reactors, the technological underpinnings of an acceptable global nonproliferation regime will become even more essential. Transparency of operations needs to provide formal international assurance of the absence of illicit activities. Providing that level of transparency is a theoretical and technological challenge, but it is made even more difficult by conflicting interests. Technology providers want to capitalize on their research and development investments by protecting patents and intellectual property. Host nations have an obligation to physically protect nuclear materials, a job made more difficult by providing detailed information about the location and state of such materials to potential adversaries such as terrorist groups. In view of these conditions, it is postulated that transparency can be more easily adopted internationally when it emphasizes openness and dissemination of information on triggered operating events within the facility rather than on detailed material inventory data. Disseminating the former information appears less sensitive than circulating the latter data. Moreover, if it is to be accepted, providing adequate transparency cannot require excessive capital investment or annual operating cost, incur significant interference to plant operations or divulge information that would compromise the security of nuclear materials. Nonproliferation analysts find it useful to describe intrinsic and extrinsic proliferation barriers, the former implying innate features of a given technology that are difficult to defeat; the latter implying features of a national and international safeguards regime. Given the financial constraints on imposing such extrinsic barriers as frequent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, developers of new-generation nuclear technology will be pushed to optimize the inherent proliferation resistance of the technology to achieve an acceptable proliferation risk level. This goal can be most effectively accomplished by including such features in the design criteria, rather than back fitting plant designs to include safeguards technologies. It is postulated that the effective deployment and commercialization of nuclear technology will depend in part on the nonproliferation and transparency measures integrated into the fuel cycle design. It will also depend on its safeguards acceptance by the IAEA and whether the particular verification mechanisms adopted are achievable and affordable. In support of more direct and feasible safeguards measures, the additional provision in the Model Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements with respect to facility operations reporting is an enabling element for achieving improved nuclear transparency.
- Research Organization:
- Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- NE
- DOE Contract Number:
- DE-AC02-06CH11357
- OSTI ID:
- 925007
- Report Number(s):
- ANL/NT/CP-105069; TRN: US200807%%138
- Journal Information:
- Trans. Am. Nucl. Soc., Vol. 85, Issue 2001; Conference: Global 2001: International Conference on: Back-End of the Fuel Cycle: From Research to Solutions; Sep 9-13, 2001; Paris, France
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- ENGLISH
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Related Subjects
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES, AND NON-RADIOACTIVE WASTES FROM NUCLEAR FACILITIES
21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS
29 ENERGY PLANNING
POLICY AND ECONOMY
ENERGY DEMAND
ENERGY SYSTEMS
FUEL CYCLE
NUCLEAR ENERGY
NUCLEAR FUELS
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
OPERATING COST
POWER PLANTS
PROLIFERATION
RADIOACTIVE WASTES
SAFEGUARDS