Will Russian Scientists Go Rogue? A Survey on the Threat and the Impact of Western Assistance
The collapse of the Soviet Union sparked fears throughout the world that rogue nations and terrorist organizations would gain access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). One specific concern has been 'WMD brain drain.' Russians with knowledge about nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons could now depart to any country of their choice, including rogue nations seeking to produce WMD. Meanwhile, Russian science fell into a protracted crisis, with plummeting salaries, little funding for research, and few new recruits to science. These developments increased both the incentives and the opportunities for scientists to sell their knowledge to governments and terrorist organizations with hostile intentions toward the United States. Recognizing the threat of WMD brain drain from Russia, the United States, and other governments implemented a host of programs designed to reduce the risk. Despite, or perhaps partly because of, massive assistance from the West to prevent scientists with WMD knowledge from emigrating, the threat of Russian WMD brain drain has recently faded from view. Yet we have seen no evidence that these programs are effective and little systematic assessment of the current threat of WMD migration. Our data from an unprecedented survey of 602 Russian physicists, biologists, and chemists suggest that the threat of WMD brain drain from Russia should still be at the forefront of our attention. Roughly 20 percent of Russian physicists, biologists, and chemists say they would consider working in rogue nations such as North Korea, Iran, Syria, or Iraq (still considered a rogue state at the time of the survey). At the same time, the data reveal that U.S. and Western nonproliferation assistance programs work. They significantly reduce the likelihood that Russian scientists would consider working in these countries. Moreover, Russian grants do not reduce scientists' propensity to 'go rogue'. These survey findings have clear policy implications: the U.S. and its allies must continue to adequately fund nonproliferation assistance programs rather than hastily declare victory. The U.S. should remain engaged with former Soviet WMD scientists until they are willing and able to find support for their research from competitive, civilian-oriented, privately funded projects. Otherwise, we run a great risk that WMD expertise will migrate from the former Soviet Union to countries or organizations that harbor hostile intentions toward the U.S. Assistance programs work to reduce the threat of WMD brain drain, but their task is not complete. Now is not the time to pull back.
- Research Organization:
- Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE
- DOE Contract Number:
- W-7405-ENG-48
- OSTI ID:
- 917884
- Report Number(s):
- UCRL-CONF-208787; TRN: US200817%%992
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: Presented at: Program on New Approaches to Russian Security Policy Conference, DC, DC, United States, Feb 04 - Feb 04, 2005
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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