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Title: North Korea's nuclear weapons program:verification priorities and new challenges.

Abstract

A comprehensive settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue may involve military, economic, political, and diplomatic components, many of which will require verification to ensure reciprocal implementation. This paper sets out potential verification methodologies that might address a wide range of objectives. The inspection requirements set by the International Atomic Energy Agency form the foundation, first as defined at the time of the Agreed Framework in 1994, and now as modified by the events since revelation of the North Korean uranium enrichment program in October 2002. In addition, refreezing the reprocessing facility and 5 MWe reactor, taking possession of possible weapons components and destroying weaponization capabilities add many new verification tasks. The paper also considers several measures for the short-term freezing of the North's nuclear weapon program during the process of negotiations, should that process be protracted. New inspection technologies and monitoring tools are applicable to North Korean facilities and may offer improved approaches over those envisioned just a few years ago. These are noted, and potential bilateral and regional verification regimes are examined.

Authors:
 [1]
  1. (Korean Consulate General in New York)
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Sandia National Laboratories
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE
OSTI Identifier:
876296
Report Number(s):
SAND2003-4558
TRN: US0601170
DOE Contract Number:
AC04-94AL85000
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS; 45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEFENSE; FREEZING; IAEA; IMPLEMENTATION; ISOTOPE SEPARATION; MONITORING; NUCLEAR WEAPONS; REPROCESSING; VERIFICATION; WEAPONS; Arms control-Verification.; Nuclear arms control-Verification.; Nuclear weapons; Korea (North); Korea (North-Politics and government.

Citation Formats

Moon, Duk-ho. North Korea's nuclear weapons program:verification priorities and new challenges.. United States: N. p., 2003. Web. doi:10.2172/876296.
Moon, Duk-ho. North Korea's nuclear weapons program:verification priorities and new challenges.. United States. doi:10.2172/876296.
Moon, Duk-ho. 2003. "North Korea's nuclear weapons program:verification priorities and new challenges.". United States. doi:10.2172/876296. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/876296.
@article{osti_876296,
title = {North Korea's nuclear weapons program:verification priorities and new challenges.},
author = {Moon, Duk-ho},
abstractNote = {A comprehensive settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue may involve military, economic, political, and diplomatic components, many of which will require verification to ensure reciprocal implementation. This paper sets out potential verification methodologies that might address a wide range of objectives. The inspection requirements set by the International Atomic Energy Agency form the foundation, first as defined at the time of the Agreed Framework in 1994, and now as modified by the events since revelation of the North Korean uranium enrichment program in October 2002. In addition, refreezing the reprocessing facility and 5 MWe reactor, taking possession of possible weapons components and destroying weaponization capabilities add many new verification tasks. The paper also considers several measures for the short-term freezing of the North's nuclear weapon program during the process of negotiations, should that process be protracted. New inspection technologies and monitoring tools are applicable to North Korean facilities and may offer improved approaches over those envisioned just a few years ago. These are noted, and potential bilateral and regional verification regimes are examined.},
doi = {10.2172/876296},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = 2003,
month =
}

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