Basis for Interim Operation for Fuel Supply Shutdown Facility

Technical Report · Sat Feb 01 04:00:00 EST 2003

DOI:https://doi.org/10.2172/810503· OSTI ID:810503

Benecke, M. W. ^[1]

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1. Fluor Hanford, Richland, WA (United States); FH

This document establishes the Basis for Interim Operation (BIO) for the Fuel Supply Shutdown Facility (FSS) as managed by the 300 Area Deactivation Project (300 ADP) organization in accordance with the requirements of the Project Hanford Management Contract procedure (PHMC) HNF-PRO-700, ''Safety Analysis and Technical Safety Requirements''. A hazard classification (Benecke 2003a) has been prepared for the facility in accordance with DOE-STD-1027-92 resulting in the assignment of Hazard Category 3 for FSS Facility buildings that store N Reactor fuel materials (303-B, 3712, and 3716). All others are designated Industrial buildings. It is concluded that the risks associated with the current and planned operational mode of the FSS Facility (uranium storage, uranium repackaging and shipment, cleanup, and transition activities, etc.) are acceptable. The potential radiological dose and toxicological consequences for a range of credible uranium storage building have been analyzed using Hanford accepted methods. Risk Class designations are summarized for representative events in Table 1.6-1. Mitigation was not considered for any event except the random fire event that exceeds predicted consequences based on existing source and combustible loading because of an inadvertent increase in combustible loading. For that event, a housekeeping program to manage transient combustibles is credited to reduce the probability. An additional administrative control is established to protect assumptions regarding source term by limiting inventories of fuel and combustible materials. Another is established to maintain the criticality safety program. Additional defense-in-depth controls are established to perform fire protection system testing, inspection, and maintenance to ensure predicted availability of those systems, and to maintain the radiological control program. It is also concluded that because an accidental nuclear criticality is not credible based on the low uranium enrichment, the form of the uranium, and the required controls, a Criticality Alarm System (CAS) is not required as allowed by DOE Order 420.1 (DOE 2000).

• Research Organization: Fluor Hanford, Richland, WA (United States)
• Sponsoring Organization: USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP); USDOE Office of Environmental Management (EM)
• DOE Contract Number: AC06-96RL13200
• OSTI ID: 810503
• Report Number(s): HNF--10108-Rev.0; EDT-621766
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS
38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEAR CHEMISTRY
ALARM SYSTEMS
CRITICALITY
DEACTIVATION
FSS Facility
Fuel Materials
INVENTORIES
ISOTOPE SEPARATION
MAINTENANCE
MANAGEMENT
MITIGATION
N-REACTOR
Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP)
Project Hanford Management Contract Procedure
SAFETY
SHUTDOWN
SOURCE TERMS
STORAGE
URANIUM
Uranium Storage