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Title: Operational Readiness Review Final Report for K Basin Fuel Transfer System

Technical Report ·
DOI:https://doi.org/10.2172/808403· OSTI ID:808403

An Operational Readiness Review (ORR) was conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Richland Operations Office (RL) to verify that an adequate state of readiness had been achieved for startup of the K Basin Fuel Transfer System (FTS). The DOE ORR was conducted during the period November 6-18, 2002. The DOE ORR team concluded that the K Basin Fuel Transfer System is ready to start operations, subject to completion and verification of identified pre-start findings. The ORR was conducted in accordance with the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) K Basin Fuel Transfer System (FTS) Operational Readiness Review (ORR) Plan of Action and the Operational Readiness Review Implementation Plan for K Basin Fuel Transfer System. Review activities consisted of staff interviews, procedure and document reviews, and observations of normal facility operations, operational upset conditions, and an emergency drill. The DOE ORR Team also reviewed and assessed the adequacy of the contractor ORR3 and the RL line management review. The team concurred with the findings and observations identified in these two reports. The DOE ORR for the FTS evaluated the contractor under single-shift operations. Of concern to the ORR Team was that SNF Project management intended to change from a single-shift FTS operation to a two-shift operation shortly after the completion of the DOE ORR. The ORR team did not assess two-shift FTS operations and the ability of the contractor to conduct a smooth transition from shift to shift. However, the DOE ORR team did observe an operational upset drill that was conducted during day shift and carried over into swing shift; during this drill, swing shift was staffed with fewer personnel as would be expected for two-shift operations. The facility was able to adequately respond to the event with the reduced level of staff. The ORR Team was also able to observe a Shift Manager turnover meeting when one shift manager had to be relieved during the middle of the day. The ORR Team did not have the opportunity to observe a shift turnover from one crew to another. The ORR Team has evaluated the risk of not observing this activity and considers the risk to be minimal based on the fact that operating staff are very familiar with the FTS equipment and its procedures, and because existing Conduct of Operations processes and procedures are adequate and implemented. Because the ORR Team has not observed two-shift FTS operations, we recommend that additional RL oversight be provided at the start of two-shift FTS operations to evaluate the adequacy of crew turnovers.

Research Organization:
DOE-RL (US)
Sponsoring Organization:
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (US)
DOE Contract Number:
AC06-96RL13200
OSTI ID:
808403
Report Number(s):
DOE/RL-2002-71, Rev.0; TRN: US0302256
Resource Relation:
Other Information: PBD: 1 Oct 2002
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English