CSER-00-007 Addendum 1: Criticality Safety Evaluation of Shippingport PWR Core 2 Blanket
- Fluor Daniel Hanford, Inc., Richland, WA (United States); FH
This analysis meets the requirements of HNF-7098, Criticality Safety Program, (FH 2001a). HNF-7098 states that before starting a new operation with fissile material or before an existing operation is changed, it shall be determined that the entire process will be subcritical under both normal and credible abnormal conditions. To demonstrate the Incredibility Principle is satisfied, this Criticality Safety Evaluation Report (CSER) shows that the form or distribution is such that criticality is impossible. This evaluation demonstrated, that on the basis of effective 235U enrichment, criticality is not possible. The minimum blanket assembly exposure is 4,375 MW t d/MTU for fissile material that is shown to fulfill the Incredibility Principle safety criterion on the basis of enrichment.
- Research Organization:
- Fluor Daniel Hanford, Inc., Richland, WA (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE Office of Environmental Management (EM); USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP)
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC06-96RL13200
- OSTI ID:
- 807323
- Report Number(s):
- HNF--8853-Rev.0; EDT-619498
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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