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Title: Project Management Plan (PMP) for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Project

Abstract

This plan presents the overall objectives, description, justification and planning for the PFP IAEA project. The intent of this plan is to describe how this project will be managed and integrated with other facility stabilization and deactivation activities. This plan supplements the overall integrated plan presented in the Plutonium Finishing Plant Integrated Project Management Plan (IPMP) HNF-3617 Rev 0.

Authors:
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
BWHC (US)
Sponsoring Org.:
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (US)
OSTI Identifier:
798005
Report Number(s):
HNF-3751, Rev.1
TRN: US200222%%360
DOE Contract Number:
AC06-96RL13200
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Resource Relation:
Other Information: PBD: 14 Sep 1999
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; IAEA; PLANNING; PLUTONIUM; PROGRAM MANAGEMENT; SAFEGUARDS; STABILIZATION

Citation Formats

BARTLETT, W.D. Project Management Plan (PMP) for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Project. United States: N. p., 1999. Web. doi:10.2172/798005.
BARTLETT, W.D. Project Management Plan (PMP) for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Project. United States. doi:10.2172/798005.
BARTLETT, W.D. 1999. "Project Management Plan (PMP) for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Project". United States. doi:10.2172/798005. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/798005.
@article{osti_798005,
title = {Project Management Plan (PMP) for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Project},
author = {BARTLETT, W.D.},
abstractNote = {This plan presents the overall objectives, description, justification and planning for the PFP IAEA project. The intent of this plan is to describe how this project will be managed and integrated with other facility stabilization and deactivation activities. This plan supplements the overall integrated plan presented in the Plutonium Finishing Plant Integrated Project Management Plan (IPMP) HNF-3617 Rev 0.},
doi = {10.2172/798005},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = 1999,
month = 9
}

Technical Report:

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