Skip to main content
U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Scientific and Technical Information

Extended Deterrence, Nuclear Proliferation, and START III

Technical Report ·
DOI:https://doi.org/10.2172/793964· OSTI ID:793964

Early in the Cold War, the United States adopted a policy of ''extended nuclear deterrence'' to protect its allies by threatening a nuclear strike against any state that attacks these allies. This threat can (in principle) be used to try to deter an enemy attack using conventional weapons or one using nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. The credibility of a nuclear threat has long been subject to debate and is dependent on many complex geopolitical factors, not the least of which is the military capabilities of the opposing sides. The ending of the Cold War has led to a significant decrease in the number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by the United States and Russia. START II, which was recently ratified by the Russian Duma, will (if implemented) reduce the number deployed strategic nuclear weapons on each side to 3500, compared to a level of over 11,000 at the end of the Cold War in 1991. The tentative limit established by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin for START III would reduce the strategic force level to 2000-2500. However, the Russians (along with a number of arms control advocates) now argue that the level should be reduced even further--to 1500 warheads or less. The conventional view is that ''deep cuts'' in nuclear weapons are necessary to discourage nuclear proliferation. Thus, as part of the bargain to get the non-nuclear states to agree to the renewal of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States pledged to work towards greater reductions in strategic forces. Without movement in the direction of deep cuts, it is thought by many analysts that some countries may decide to build their own nuclear weapons. Indeed, this was part of the rationale India used to justify its own nuclear weapons program. However, there is also some concern that deep cuts (to 1500 or lower) in the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal could have the opposite effect. The fear is that such cuts might undermine extended deterrence and cause a crisis in confidence among U.S. allies to such an extent that they could seek nuclear weapons of their own to protect themselves.

Research Organization:
Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (US)
Sponsoring Organization:
USDOE Office of Defense Programs (DP) (US)
DOE Contract Number:
W-7405-ENG-48
OSTI ID:
793964
Report Number(s):
UCRL-ID-139508
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English

Similar Records

Paring down the arsenal
Journal Article · Thu May 01 00:00:00 EDT 1997 · Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists · OSTI ID:530825

Nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament and extended deterrence in the new security environment
Conference · Wed Dec 31 23:00:00 EST 2008 · OSTI ID:989766

Operational nuclear deterrence. Final report
Technical Report · Thu Dec 31 23:00:00 EST 1992 · OSTI ID:6355283