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Surety of human elements of high consequence systems: An organic model

Conference ·
OSTI ID:756088

Despite extensive safety analysis and application of safety measures, there is a frequent lament, ``Why do we continue to have accidents?'' Two breakdowns are prevalent in risk management and prevention. First, accidents result from human actions that engineers, analysts and management never envisioned and second, controls, intended to preclude/mitigate accident sequences, prove inadequate. This paper addresses the first breakdown, the inability to anticipate scenarios involving human action/inaction. The failure of controls has been addressed in a previous publication (Forsythe and Grose, 1998). Specifically, this paper presents an approach referred to as surety. The objective of this approach is to provide high levels of assurance in situations where potential system failure paths cannot be fully characterized. With regard to human elements of complex systems, traditional approaches to human reliability are not sufficient to attain surety. Consequently, an Organic Model has been developed to account for the organic properties exhibited by engineered systems that result from human involvement in those systems.

Research Organization:
Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (US); Sandia National Labs., Livermore, CA (US)
Sponsoring Organization:
US Department of Energy (US)
DOE Contract Number:
AC04-94AL85000
OSTI ID:
756088
Report Number(s):
SAND2000-1061C
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English

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