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U.S. Department of Energy
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Plutonium, proliferation, and policy

Journal Article · · Technol. Rev.; (United States)
OSTI ID:7306055
Commissioner Gilinsky feels that the dangers of plutonium demand that international commercial ventures make no distinction between military and non-military explosives in the establishment of oversight and safeguard procedures, preferably by compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Agreements on these procedures must be strictly adhered to with no exceptions for political or economic expediency. The history of the relationship between nuclear power programs, plutonium production, and the proliferation potential from fuel processing programs is reviewed. Confusion has been encouraged in the U.S. and abroad over the potential for making nuclear weapons from power-reactor plutonium, and the public has not been reassured by the International Atomic Energy Agency's inability to make clear the fact that it is possible to safeguard reactor-grade plutonium. United States policy has tended to limit our options by concentrating on breeder reactor development and accepting more relaxed international than domestic policies. Although the U.S. no longer has a monopoly over nuclear technology, its dominance over the supply of enriched fuel should reflect a concern for how this fuel is used. (DCK)
Research Organization:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
OSTI ID:
7306055
Journal Information:
Technol. Rev.; (United States), Journal Name: Technol. Rev.; (United States) Vol. 79:4; ISSN TEREA
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English