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Nuclear proliferation. II. Monopoly or cartel

Journal Article · · Foreign Policy; (United States)
OSTI ID:7300143

Increasing competition between a growing number of nations exporting nuclear technology and recent exporting of full fuel-cycle facilities raise fears of nuclear proliferation and widespread nuclear weapons. As a result of the 1973 oil crisis, industrial nations seeking a share in the international nuclear market in order to protect their economic interests must also cooperate to protect these same interests from nuclear risks. Disagreement over the form of cooperation centers on the competing exporters' tactics of undercutting safeguards and political restrictions. Monopoly was never an option for even the United States. Government intervention in the international nuclear market in the form of subsidies and financial incentives is a more practical approach than a free market. A cartel arrangement is appropriate to nuclear energy in the sense of reducing economic uncertainties, but political objections would be strong and there would be some risk of independent nuclear development. As a strategy to forestall proliferation, however, the cartel can control exports of enrichment and reprocessing facilities and make it more expensive for nations to independently develop nuclear weapons. An enlargement of safeguards arrangements by nuclear suppliers will require nations to trade some of their economic interests in order to achieve international political objectives. (DCK)

Research Organization:
Harvard Univ., Cambridge, MA
OSTI ID:
7300143
Journal Information:
Foreign Policy; (United States), Journal Name: Foreign Policy; (United States) Vol. 23; ISSN FRPLA
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English