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Spreading the bomb without quite breaking the rules

Journal Article · · Foreign Policy; (United States)
DOI:https://doi.org/10.2307/1148025· OSTI ID:7231145
Careless policies of the U.S. and other nuclear exporters could allow fissile materials to be diverted from research laboratories and power plants without clearly violating International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Nuclear agreements do not cover bomb design and non-nuclear components, but continued export of nuclear reactor technology may allow nonweapon states to accomplish this weaponry if they so desire. Recommendations to change current policies cover both demand and supply. To reduce the demand requires agreements by the nuclear countries to provide both nuclear and non-nuclear defense appropriate to the threat. Recommendations for changes in supply policies include (1) denying access and designing reactors to limit access to fissionable materials, (2) postponing U.S. efforts to separate plutonium for ten years and denying export licenses for plutonium separation facilities, (3) providing reasonably priced low-enriched uranium services to nonweapon states on a lease basis or arranging for the return of spent fuel, (4) encouraging international centers for enrichment technology, (5) limiting research assistance to U.S. or international facilities, (6) revising Export-Import Bank policies to support these objectives, and (7) offering IAEA financial and technical assistance and requiring more stringent monitoring by IAEA. (DCK)
Research Organization:
Univ. of Chicago
OSTI ID:
7231145
Journal Information:
Foreign Policy; (United States), Journal Name: Foreign Policy; (United States) Vol. 25; ISSN FRPLA
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English