Challenge inspections in Arms Control treaties: Any lessons for strengthening NPT verification. [Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)]

Conference · Wed Jan 01 04:00:00 EST 1992

OSTI ID:7166074

Allentuck, J

Recent revelations of an ongoing and sophisticated nuclear weapons development program in Iraq have lead to suggestions for strengthening International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Especially troubling was the realization that safeguards, as presently applied, could not possibly have detected such a program. It is clear that the inspections which have taken place in Iraq since the Gulf War could only have been imposed on a nation which had suffered a severe military defeat. It has, however, been argued that challenge or challenge like'' inspections already incorporated in or proposed for the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (the CFE Treaty) the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Treaty Between the United States and the USSR on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic offensive Arms (START) might serve as models for enhanced special inspections in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT). The expectation that none of the challenge or challenge like inspections in the above treaties would provide a model for the NPT was confirmed although certain characteristics of these inspections do provide useful points of departure. Although the context of challenge inspections in CWC bears substantial similarity to the NPT, it is from the provisions for suspect-site'' and formerly declared site'', challenge like inspections in START that innovative ideas for strengthening special inspections in NPT may be derived.

• Research Organization: Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States)
• Sponsoring Organization: DOE; USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)
• DOE Contract Number: AC02-76CH00016
• OSTI ID: 7166074
• Report Number(s): BNL-46941; CONF-9207102--57; ON: DE92019496
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

350300* -- Arms Control-- Verification-- (1987-)
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
ARMS CONTROL
CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS
IAEA
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
ON-SITE INSPECTION
SAFEGUARDS
TREATIES
VERIFICATION
WEAPONS