Public policies of a private utility: the political economics of Consolidated Edison
A fundamental assumption underlying America's private enterprise system is that as economic pressures and social values evolve, business can and will respond in an economically rational and efficient manner. Without such assistance and adaptability, a business will be unable to maintain its market. The regulatory assumptions enforcing this for electric utilities are explored in Chapter 1. In the early 1970s fuel and capital costs skyrocketed and conservation of energy and capital became an overwhelming national priority. Con Edison, which has historically depended on selling (without regard to conserving) energy to generate revenues, was forced to respond. As Chapter 2 points out, it did so by using the state and its regulatory agencies to its advantage, however incompatible with rational market economics. Chapter 3 points out that Con Edison managed to exploit its market position as a local monopolist to preclude an alternative energy system from developing. Chapter 4 raises the issue as to whether Con Edison still qualifies, primarily in economic terms, to be a given monopoly franchise over NYC's electrical grid; it goes on to analyze some utility reform measures historically considered.
- Research Organization:
- City Univ. of New York, NY (USA)
- OSTI ID:
- 7143738
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
Similar Records
Distributed Energy Alternative to Electrical Distribution Grid Expansion in Consolidated Edison Service Territory
Oil privatization growing: Peru poised for comeback
Related Subjects
290200 -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Economics & Sociology
296000* -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Electric Power
ELECTRIC UTILITIES
FEDERAL REGION II
INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
MARKET
MONOPOLIES
NEW YORK
NEW YORK CITY
NORTH AMERICA
PUBLIC POLICY
PUBLIC UTILITIES
REGULATIONS
SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS
USA