Dispelling myths about verification of sea-launched cruise missiles

Journal Article · Fri Nov 10 00:00:00 EST 1989 · Science (Washington, D.C.); (USA)

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1126/science.246.4931.765· OSTI ID:7127464

Lewis, G N ^[1]; Ride, S K ^[2]; Townsend, J S ^[3]

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1. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge (USA)
2. Univ. of California at San Diego, La Jolla (USA)
3. Harvey Mudd College, Claremont, CA (USA)

It is widely believed that an arms control limit on nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles would be nearly impossible to verify. Among the reasons usually given are: these weapons are small, built in nondistinctive industrial facilities, deployed on a variety of ships and submarines, and difficult to distinguish from their conventionally armed counterparts. In this article, it is argued that the covert production and deployment of nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles would not be so straightforward. A specific arms control proposed is described, namely a total ban on nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles. This proposal is used to illustrate how an effective verification scheme might be constructed. 9 refs., 6 figs.

• OSTI ID: 7127464
• Journal Information: Science (Washington, D.C.); (USA), Vol. 246:4931; ISSN 0036-8075
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
CRUISE MISSILES
VERIFICATION
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
ARMS CONTROL
MISSILES
WEAPONS
055001* - Nuclear Fuels- Safeguards
Inspection
& Accountability- Technical Aspects