Dispelling myths about verification of sea-launched cruise missiles
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge (USA)
- Univ. of California at San Diego, La Jolla (USA)
- Harvey Mudd College, Claremont, CA (USA)
It is widely believed that an arms control limit on nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles would be nearly impossible to verify. Among the reasons usually given are: these weapons are small, built in nondistinctive industrial facilities, deployed on a variety of ships and submarines, and difficult to distinguish from their conventionally armed counterparts. In this article, it is argued that the covert production and deployment of nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles would not be so straightforward. A specific arms control proposed is described, namely a total ban on nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles. This proposal is used to illustrate how an effective verification scheme might be constructed. 9 refs., 6 figs.
- OSTI ID:
- 7127464
- Journal Information:
- Science (Washington, D.C.); (USA), Journal Name: Science (Washington, D.C.); (USA) Vol. 246:4931; ISSN SCIEA; ISSN 0036-8075
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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