Economic incentives for hazardous-waste management: Deposit-refunded systems and used lubricating oil
Economic incentives have been widely advocated for controlling environmental externalities. There has been increasing interest in devising such incentives to reduce the generation of hazardous waste. It is demonstrated that since firms comply with existing disposal rules, there is no efficiency basis for additional incentives. In contrast, incentives may be appropriate for firms that do not comply with existing rules. A range of regulatory instruments is compared, including taxes on inputs and waste generation, and subsidies for safe disposal and waste minimization. Each instrument has undesirable properties. Waste-end taxes encourage illegal disposal; safe-disposal subsides stimulate waste generation; and waste-minimization subsidies cannot be effectively targeted. The economic incentive instrument proposed is a combination of input taxes and safe-disposal subsidies, sometime manifest in the deposit-refund system. This instrument is efficiency-enhancing under plausible real-world conditions. The theoretical results are applied to the case of used lubricating oil, a large-volume waste stream that has vexed regulators for many years. An empirical model is developed that enables the simulation of prices, quantities, and net social benefits resulting from the establishment of a tax-subsidy or deposit-refund system. This model accounts for variations in: price-responsiveness; residual external damage from disposal; ex ante rates of regulatory compliance; and the level of transactions costs implied by the program. The instrument offers positive net social benefits, but only under a narrow range of conditions. The model is modified to apply to a generic hazardous waste problem that emphasizes illegal dumping. The existence of positive net social benefits depends on differences in risk across disposal options, the ex ante level of regulatory compliance, and the magnitude of unit transactions costs.
- Research Organization:
- Harvard Univ., Boston, MA (USA)
- OSTI ID:
- 7125560
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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Related Subjects
290300* -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Environment
Health
& Safety
DOCUMENT TYPES
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
EFFICIENCY
ENERGY EFFICIENCY
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
LEGAL INCENTIVES
MANAGEMENT
MATERIALS
REGULATORY GUIDES
RESOURCE CONSERVATION
WASTE MANAGEMENT