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Title: Economic analysis of regulation and crime in hazardous waste disposal

Thesis/Dissertation ·
OSTI ID:7053089

A novel, binary waste taxonomy gives precise meaning hence analytical power to the term hazardous. Dispersion wastes dominate the literature, hazardous wastes have been ignored. Production determines environmental damage for dispersion wastes. For hazardous wastes this link is severed, damage depends on the waste's disposition. Imperfect monitoring and enforcement make criminal disposal an option. This economic decision is analyzed via models of a firm, a regulator, and their interactions under uncertainty. Necessary and sufficient agency behaviors are found which force firm production and disposition decisions to separate, permitting agency attack of illicit disposal without affecting production, consumption, or law-abiding firms. A Stackelberg follower agency strategy may yield less illicit disposal as well as higher welfare than the Stackelberg leader agency's larger budget and staff. Both of these strategies' outcomes are determinate and welfare superior to the Nash-Cournot. Regulation drives cost, hence fees at legal dumpsites, which are the incentive to covert disposal. Fines and costly enforcement provide only partial counter-incentives. Subsidization of the dump fee, and instrument present policy neglects, must raise welfare in this model.

Research Organization:
Wyoming Univ., Laramie (USA)
OSTI ID:
7053089
Resource Relation:
Other Information: Thesis (Ph. D.)
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English