The inefficiency and unfairness of tradable CO[sub 2] permits

Conference · Tue Jun 01 04:00:00 EDT 1993 · World Resource Review; (United States)

OSTI ID:7012129

Erickson, J D ^[1]

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1. Cornell Univ., Ithaca, NY (United States). Dept. of Agricultural Economics

Various CO[sub 2] permit schemes have been proposed as equitable, efficient, and politically acceptable means to effectively address the threat of global climate change. The present analysis suggests the direction, level, and terms of trade in North-South permit trading. Domestic permit market failure and international development aid experience are drawn on for insight into a global permit system. The conclusion emphasizes inconsistencies in the theoretical assumptions of marginal cost distribution and pricing, and market neutrality. In addition, the likelihood of international permit market failure and the unfair and inefficient consequences of international application are stressed. In contrast to traditional analyses, a tradable permit system avoids the requirements of equity and efficiency, failing as an effective climate treaty. Promoting the profitability of abatement in the developed world and a restructuring of development aid in the developing world is suggested in lieu of a single market approach.

• OSTI ID: 7012129
• Report Number(s): CONF-930415--
• Conference Information: Journal Name: World Resource Review; (United States) Journal Volume: 5:2
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY
290300 -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Environment
Health
& Safety
54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES
540120* -- Environment
Atmospheric-- Chemicals Monitoring & Transport-- (1990-)
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
AIR POLLUTION CONTROL
ALLOCATIONS
CARBON COMPOUNDS
CARBON DIOXIDE
CARBON OXIDES
CHALCOGENIDES
CLIMATIC CHANGE
CONTROL
ECOLOGICAL CONCENTRATION
EMISSION
ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS
OXIDES
OXYGEN COMPOUNDS
PERMITS
POLLUTION CONTROL