United States national security policy making and Vietnam
The United States failed to achieve its goals in waging a war in Vietnam. This thesis endeavors to show that this failure was due to errors in the formulation of American national security policy regarding Vietnam. The policy making process went astray, at least in part, due to a narrowing of the role of senior military officers as national security policy makers. The restricted role of senior officers as national security policy makers adversely affected American policy formulation regarding Vietnam. The United States response to the coup against Diem in 1963 and the deployment of conventional American forces to ground combat in Vietnam, in 1965 were undertaken without a clear recognition of the considerable costs of the commitments being assumed. Senior military officers had prompted such a recognition in similar previous crises but were not in a policy making position to do so concerning Vietnam. The policymaking input that was absent was ethical counsel of a fundamental nature. Clausewitz viewed the mortality of a war as being embodied in the national will to fight that war. The absence of an accurate appreciation of the costs of a military solution in Vietnam denied civilian officials a critical policy making factor and contributed significantly to the defeat of the American purpose there.
- Research Organization:
- Louisville Univ., KY (USA)
- OSTI ID:
- 6978682
- Resource Relation:
- Other Information: Thesis (Ph. D.)
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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