Modeling strategic pricing in bilateral and POOLCO markets: A Nash-Cournot approach
- Johns Hopkins Univ., Baltimore, MD (United States). Dept. of Geography and Environmental Engineering
There are a wide range of models that have been proposed for simulating the interaction of competing generation companies who price strategically. Such models have been used to identify how market power might be wielded in restructured power markets and the impacts of proposed mergers. This paper presents two specific models, that like many previous models, adopt a Nash-Cournot framework and represent transmission constraints by a linearized DC network. Unlike previous models, however, these formulations readily lend themselves to computation even for large markets with hundreds of transmission interfaces and control areas, while possibly guaranteeing the existence of unique price equilibria. Previous Cournot models have been applied to relatively small networks (a few dozen busses or fewer) and potentially have either no price equilibria or many price equilibria.
- Research Organization:
- Illinois Inst. of Tech., Chicago, IL (United States)
- OSTI ID:
- 696714
- Report Number(s):
- CONF-990410-PROC.-Vol.1; TRN: IM9946%%100
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: 61. American power conference annual meeting, Chicago, IL (United States), 6-8 Apr 1999; Other Information: PBD: 1999; Related Information: Is Part Of Proceedings of the American power conference: Volume 61-1; McBride, A.E. [ed.]; PB: 540 p.
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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