Deterrence and decision: an historical critique of modern deterrence theory

Thesis/Dissertation · Sat Jan 01 04:00:00 EST 1983

OSTI ID:6922269

Sagan, S D

Nuclear deterrence theory, as developed in the United States, has been largely speculative rather than historical, prescriptive rather than explanatory. This is both understandable and unfortunate. It is understandable because the destructive power of nuclear weapons is unprecendented. It is unfortunate, however, because the study of strategic success and failure in the pre-nuclear era can still illuminate many current dilemmas. This thesis steps across the nuclear divide to examine what earlier strategists and statesmen thought about the problem of deterrence. Two chapters trace the evolution of competing traditions in strategic thought from Jomini and Clausewitz in the ninteenth century to nuclear strategists in the 1980's. The first is the science of war tradition which emphasizes the importance of materials factors in determining the outbreaks and the outcomes of war; the second is the art of war tradition which focuses on the moral elements of conflict, the political and psychological factors influencing strategy. The thesis argues that, while neither the material nor the moral elements of strategy should be ignored, the art of war tradition is still superior in the nuclear age.

• OSTI ID: 6922269
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY
290600* -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Nuclear Energy
DECISION MAKING
EVALUATION
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
WARFARE