Resolution of shipper-receiver differences
Every facility strives to comply with DOE order 5630.2 requiring independent and timely measurements between facility shipments. While it is desirable to resolve shipper-receiver (S/R) differences before processing any of the material, this is not always possible or practical. Two examples are discussed where there is an apparent measurement bias between the shipping and receiving facilities. This measurement bias persisted over several shipments resulting in more S/R differences outside the combined error limits than expected. For the first example, the receiver could not measure the material until processed. In the second example, the receiving facility made Nondestructive Analysis (NDA) measurements of the shipments before processing. However, shipments were closed by dissolution until a measurement problem with the dissolution required using the ND measurements for the next two shipments indicated the same size shipper-receiver difference. Individual items outside limits were identified and measured by an independent arbitrator. While no definite answer exists that will resolve shipper-receiver differences in all situations, the examples presented of studies and investigations to identify biases and verify the integrity of the measurements could be applied at other facilities. 2 figs., 1 tab.
- Research Organization:
- Du Pont de Nemours (E.I.) and Co., Aiken, SC (USA). Savannah River Plant
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC09-76SR00001
- OSTI ID:
- 6847189
- Report Number(s):
- DP-MS-88-40; CONF-880631-26; ON: DE88013778
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: 29. annual meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, Las Vegas, NV, USA, 26 Jun 1988; Other Information: Paper copy only, copy does not permit microfiche production
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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