Verification and risk in arms control
A close look at the view that arms control treaties or provisions that are less than 100% verifiable cannot be in the national interest also examines the broader fundamental relationship between verification in arms control and risk to national security. It concludes that verifiability of arms control treaties is not a fixed measure of objective quality. The criteria for what constitutes an adequately verifiable treaty will change as a function of the political environment. Instead, the issue of verification and the risks of arms control should be approached on the basis of whether the military and political threat posed by undetected cheating is greater than the military and political threat posed by unconstrained military activity. 12 references, 2 tables.
- Research Organization:
- Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., Cambridge
- OSTI ID:
- 6836188
- Journal Information:
- Int. Secur.; (United States), Journal Name: Int. Secur.; (United States) Vol. 8:4; ISSN INTSD
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
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POLITICAL ASPECTS
RISK ASSESSMENT
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