Intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) treaty: an operational error

Technical Report · Thu May 12 00:00:00 EDT 1988

OSTI ID:6813711

Caldwell, W B

The purpose of this paper is to examine the operational impact of the INF treaty and what it means for the future of NATO. At this writing, there is considerable debate going on as to whether or not the US Congress should ratify the INF treaty. The political issues are well known and under careful examination. A critical element that still needs to be addressed is the operational impact of the INF treaty. This area may have been neglected because nuclear weapons are viewed primarily as an element of deterrence. Therefore, their warfighting potential is given only minimal consideration. This paper begins with a discussion of the historical use of nuclear weapons in NATO's defensive Alliance. It follows through to the decision in 1979 to modernize NATO's nuclear force. This decision resulted in the deployment of the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) systems in Europe. The Soviet warfighting concept for Europe is addressed next to place the intermediate-range nuclear forces in their proper perspective. This is followed by a discussion on the operational implications of the INF treaty. The paper concludes by briefly mentioning a few of the defensive proposals for the post-INF period.

• Research Organization: Army Command and General Staff Coll., Fort Leavenworth, KS (USA). School of Advanced Military Studies
• OSTI ID: 6813711
• Report Number(s): AD-A-195451/0/XAB
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

29 ENERGY PLANNING
POLICY AND ECONOMY
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
ARMS CONTROL
TREATIES
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
CRUISE MISSILES
EUROPE
NATO
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
MISSILES
WEAPONS
290600* - Energy Planning & Policy- Nuclear Energy
350000 - Arms Control- (1987-)