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Title: Transmission access and pricing with multiple separate energy forward markets

Abstract

California`s congestion management protocols provide comparable access and prices to all users of the transmission system (power exchange and bilateral contract parties). The users implicitly bid for capacity on major transmission paths between zones. The Independent System Operator (ISO) allocates the available transmission capacity on these paths so that it maximizes the value of this capacity as measured by the users` bids. Everyone scheduling flow on a congested path is charged the marginal-cost-based price for using the path. The ISO keeps each party`s portfolio of generation and load individually in balance when adjusting schedules to relieve congestion on interzonal paths. By keeping the portfolios of the different parties separate, the ISO clears its transmission market without arranging energy trades between parties. Parties are responsible for arranging their own trades. The ISO does not become involved in the energy forward markets.

Authors:
 [1];  [2];  [3]
  1. Perot Systems Corp., Los Angeles, CA (United States)
  2. Pacific Gas and Electric Co., San Francisco, CA (United States)
  3. Southern California Edison, Rosemead, CA (United States)
Publication Date:
OSTI Identifier:
678007
Resource Type:
Journal Article
Resource Relation:
Journal Name: IEEE Transactions on Power Systems; Journal Volume: 14; Journal Issue: 3; Other Information: PBD: Aug 1999
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
29 ENERGY PLANNING AND POLICY; POWER TRANSMISSION; PRICES; MARKET; INTERCONNECTED POWER SYSTEMS; CAPACITY; MARGINAL-COST PRICING

Citation Formats

Gribik, P.R., Angelidis, G.A., and Kovacs, R.R. Transmission access and pricing with multiple separate energy forward markets. United States: N. p., 1999. Web. doi:10.1109/59.780897.
Gribik, P.R., Angelidis, G.A., & Kovacs, R.R. Transmission access and pricing with multiple separate energy forward markets. United States. doi:10.1109/59.780897.
Gribik, P.R., Angelidis, G.A., and Kovacs, R.R. 1999. "Transmission access and pricing with multiple separate energy forward markets". United States. doi:10.1109/59.780897.
@article{osti_678007,
title = {Transmission access and pricing with multiple separate energy forward markets},
author = {Gribik, P.R. and Angelidis, G.A. and Kovacs, R.R.},
abstractNote = {California`s congestion management protocols provide comparable access and prices to all users of the transmission system (power exchange and bilateral contract parties). The users implicitly bid for capacity on major transmission paths between zones. The Independent System Operator (ISO) allocates the available transmission capacity on these paths so that it maximizes the value of this capacity as measured by the users` bids. Everyone scheduling flow on a congested path is charged the marginal-cost-based price for using the path. The ISO keeps each party`s portfolio of generation and load individually in balance when adjusting schedules to relieve congestion on interzonal paths. By keeping the portfolios of the different parties separate, the ISO clears its transmission market without arranging energy trades between parties. Parties are responsible for arranging their own trades. The ISO does not become involved in the energy forward markets.},
doi = {10.1109/59.780897},
journal = {IEEE Transactions on Power Systems},
number = 3,
volume = 14,
place = {United States},
year = 1999,
month = 8
}
  • Sound economic decisions in a complex operating environment require modeling the complex interaction of the generation and transmission system. General Electric Co.'s multiple area simulation (MAPS) production simulation model makes available three quantities vital to the pricing of transmission excess: spot prices, megawatt-miles, and cost reconstruction for transmission access. Spot prices identify the ecomonic penalties associated with losses and transmission bottlenecks by identifying the cost of generating the next megawatt of power for every bus in the system. Megawatt miles allocate the transmission usage for power contracts by monitoring the power flow associated with a given contract over all identifiedmore » transmission lines. Cost reconstruction calculates the bottom line economic effect of transmission access for all the parties in the power system. The use of MAPS to price transmission access is described.« less
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