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Technological innovation and the arms race: a comparative study of Soviet and American decisions on tactical nuclear weapons

Thesis/Dissertation ·
OSTI ID:6777089
Generalized explanations are derived for weapons innovation in the US and USSR from three main sources: from a theoretical approach (developed by students of comparative political economy) that explains divergent foreign policies as a product of the relative strengths of state and society in a given country; from an analysis of the structural characteristics of military research and development that inhibit or enhance innovation; and from a review of several cases of weapons innovation. The generalizations that emerge are as follows: In the United States, the impetus for weapons innovation comes from the bottom, from scientists and military officials. They promote the new weapon until it develops a strong bureaucratic constituency, and is then justified on the basis of an external threat. For the Soviet Union, a centralized and compartmentalized system inhibits initiative from below. The case studies of the development of tactical nuclear weapons in the US and USSR in the 1950s (based on extensive use of declassified archives and Russian-language sources) support these generalization. More recent weapons innovations suggest a similar pattern (for example, advanced-technology conventional weapons and the neutron bomb). The generalizations point to a possible arms-control solution to the qualitative arms race; a trade-off of US technological restraint for Soviet quantitative advantages.
Research Organization:
Cornell Univ., Ithaca, NY (USA)
OSTI ID:
6777089
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English