U. S. -India safeguards dispute

Journal Article · Thu Jun 01 04:00:00 EDT 1978 · Bull. At. Sci.; (United States)

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.1978.11458525· OSTI ID:6765443

Sweet, W

The current U.S.-India dispute over nuclear safeguards is likely to be the single most important test of the Carter administration's anti-proliferation policies. The Carter administration wants India to accept comprehensive safeguards that would bar further production of nuclear explosives. The Desai government wants to maintain unsafeguarded facilities, in effect keeping the weapons option open. It has been a basic tenet of Indian nuclear policy since the mid-1950s that the big powers must disarm if the small powers are to renounce acquisition of nuclear weapons. As a matter of practical policy, India is willing to forego a nuclear deterrent only if sustained world pressure keeps China's nuclear aspirations in check. As a matter of basic principle, India regards it as unfair and imperialistic that the heavily armed big powers ask for special assurances from the lightly armed small powers. India takes the position that it will cooperate with the United States only voluntarily and only if the nuclear weapon states or at least the superpowers start to clean up their own act. The superpowers must (1) negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty; (2) accept full-scope safeguards themselves, which would be tantamount to a ban on any further production of weapons-grade materials; and (3) make significant moves toward total nuclear disarmament. The dependence of India on the United States for nuclear supplies is almost negligible. India's major nuclear facilities in operation or under construction include five research reactors, seven power reactors and three reprocessing facilities. Of these 15 facilities, the United States supplied only one (the Tarapur reactor) and 12 of them are not under IAEA safeguards. The United States, in short, is threatening to terminate supplies of low-enriched uranium for just one reactor unless India places these 12 facilities under IAEA safeguards. (MCW)

• OSTI ID: 6765443
• Journal Information: Bull. At. Sci.; (United States), Journal Name: Bull. At. Sci.; (United States) Vol. 34:6; ISSN BASIA
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

055001 -- Nuclear Fuels-- Safeguards
Inspection
& Accountability-- Technical Aspects
29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY
290600* -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Nuclear Energy
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
ASIA
DECISION MAKING
ENERGY SOURCES
FOREIGN POLICY
FUELS
GOVERNMENT POLICIES
INDIA
NORTH AMERICA
NUCLEAR FUELS
NUCLEAR POWER
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
POWER
PROLIFERATION
REACTOR MATERIALS
SAFEGUARDS
USA
WEAPONS