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Title: Containment and surveillance -- A principal IAEA safeguards measure

Abstract

The growth of the safeguards inspectorate of the Agency, spanning more than 40 years, has produced a variety of interesting subjects (legal, technical, political, etc.) for recollection, discussion, and study. Although the Agency was established in 1957, the first practical inspections did not occur until the early 1960s. In the early inspections, thee was little C/S equipment available, and no optical surveillance was used. However, by the third decade of the IAEA, the 1980s, many technology advances were made, and the level of C/S equipment activities increased. By the late 1980s, some 200 Twin Minolta film camera systems were deployed by the Agency for safeguards use. At the present time, the Agency is evaluating and beginning to implement remote monitoring as part of the Strengthened Safeguards System. However, adoption of remote monitoring by international agencies cannot occur rapidly because of the many technical and policy issues associated with this activity. A glimpse into the future indicates that an important element of safeguards instrumentation will be the merging of C/S and NDA equipment into integrated systems. The use of modern interior area monitors in International Safeguards also offers a great potential for advancing C/S measures. The research in microsensors is inmore » its infancy, and the opportunities for their reducing the cost, increasing the life time, and increasing the reliability of sensors for safeguards applications are manifold. A period may be approaching in which the terminology of C/S will no longer have its original meaning, as integrated systems combining NDA instruments and C/S instruments are already in use and are expected to be the norm in the near future.« less

Authors:
;  [1];  [2]
  1. Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States)
  2. Jupiter Corp., Albuquerque, NM (United States)
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)
OSTI Identifier:
674549
Report Number(s):
SAND-97-2154C; CONF-971031-; IAEA-SM-351/49
ON: DE98000169; TRN: 99:001029
DOE Contract Number:
AC04-94AL85000
Resource Type:
Conference
Resource Relation:
Conference: International Atomic Energy Agency symposium on international safeguards, Vienna (Austria), 13-17 Oct 1997; Other Information: PBD: [1997]
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
05 NUCLEAR FUELS; IAEA SAFEGUARDS; INSPECTION; REMOTE VIEWING EQUIPMENT; HISTORICAL ASPECTS; FORECASTING; NONDESTRUCTIVE ANALYSIS; NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT

Citation Formats

Drayer, D.D., Dupree, S.A., and Sonnier, C.S. Containment and surveillance -- A principal IAEA safeguards measure. United States: N. p., 1997. Web.
Drayer, D.D., Dupree, S.A., & Sonnier, C.S. Containment and surveillance -- A principal IAEA safeguards measure. United States.
Drayer, D.D., Dupree, S.A., and Sonnier, C.S. Wed . "Containment and surveillance -- A principal IAEA safeguards measure". United States. doi:. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/674549.
@article{osti_674549,
title = {Containment and surveillance -- A principal IAEA safeguards measure},
author = {Drayer, D.D. and Dupree, S.A. and Sonnier, C.S.},
abstractNote = {The growth of the safeguards inspectorate of the Agency, spanning more than 40 years, has produced a variety of interesting subjects (legal, technical, political, etc.) for recollection, discussion, and study. Although the Agency was established in 1957, the first practical inspections did not occur until the early 1960s. In the early inspections, thee was little C/S equipment available, and no optical surveillance was used. However, by the third decade of the IAEA, the 1980s, many technology advances were made, and the level of C/S equipment activities increased. By the late 1980s, some 200 Twin Minolta film camera systems were deployed by the Agency for safeguards use. At the present time, the Agency is evaluating and beginning to implement remote monitoring as part of the Strengthened Safeguards System. However, adoption of remote monitoring by international agencies cannot occur rapidly because of the many technical and policy issues associated with this activity. A glimpse into the future indicates that an important element of safeguards instrumentation will be the merging of C/S and NDA equipment into integrated systems. The use of modern interior area monitors in International Safeguards also offers a great potential for advancing C/S measures. The research in microsensors is in its infancy, and the opportunities for their reducing the cost, increasing the life time, and increasing the reliability of sensors for safeguards applications are manifold. A period may be approaching in which the terminology of C/S will no longer have its original meaning, as integrated systems combining NDA instruments and C/S instruments are already in use and are expected to be the norm in the near future.},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Wed Dec 31 00:00:00 EST 1997},
month = {Wed Dec 31 00:00:00 EST 1997}
}

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  • In October 1954, the Statue of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) had been signed by 70 nations. The Agency was established in 1957, and at the end of its first year of operation 130 professionals were employed in all departments. By the end of 1990, the number of professionals in the Safeguards Department had increased to over 270, over 200 of whom are designated inspectors. One of the unique features of the IAEA which directly interfaces with Member States is that of on-site inspections by international officials of the IAEA. This growth cycle, spanning some 40 years, has producedmore » a variety of interesting subjects (legal, technical, political, etc.) for recollection, discussion, and study. This paper addresses the specific subject of technical means to maintain continuity of knowledge between inspection intervals--classically referred to as Containment and Surveillance.« less
  • The United States Support Program (USSP) priority for containment and surveillance (US) focuses on maintaining or improving the reliability and cost-effectiveness of C/S systems for IAEA safeguards, expanding the number of systems that are unattended and remotely monitored, and developing verification methods that help streamline the on-site inspection process. Existing IAEA C/S systems have evolved to become complex, integrated systems, which may include active seals, nondestructive assay (NDA) instruments, video cameras, and other sensors. These systems operate autonomously. They send analytical data to IAEA headquarters where it can be reviewed. These systems present challenges to the goals of improved systemmore » performance, standardization, reliability, maintainability, documentation, and cost effectiveness. One critical lesson from past experiences is the need for cooperation and common objectives among the IAEA, the developer, and the facility operator, to create a successful, cost effective system. Recent USSP C/S activities include Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant safeguard systems, production of a new shift register, numerous vulnerability assessments of C/S systems, a conduit monitoring system which identifies tampering of IAEA conduit deployed in the field, fiber optic seal upgrades, unattended monitoring system software upgrades, next generation surveillance system which will upgrade existing camera systems, and support of the IAEA's development of the universal nondestructive assay data acquisition platform.« less
  • Nuclear material accountancy is used in IAEA safeguards as a measure of fundamental importance, with containment and surveillance as important complementary measures. Over the past five years the IAEA has worked with its Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) to quantify major terms of the objectives, i.e., timeliness of detection, significant quantities and detection probabilities. The Agency is using those quantifications, as recommended by SAGSI, as guidelines for inspection planning and for evaluating the effectiveness of safeguards. The guidelines are used in this paper, together with other criteria like cost-effectiveness, compliance with legal limitation and non-intrusiveness, as yard-sticks formore » the assessment of the potential capabilities of alternative safeguards approaches. 4 refs.« less
  • What is understood to be the function of containment and surveillance (C/S) in IAEA safeguards influences both the development of system-concepts and the efforts to quantify system performance. The evolution of C/S as a safeguards measure is reviewed; the role of C/S in present operations is described, and implications for quantification are discussed.
  • The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards program provides assurance to the international community that nations are complying with nuclear safeguards treaties. In one aspect of the program, the Department of Safeguards has developed a twin Minolta camera photo surveillance systems program to assure itself and the international community that material handling is accomplished according to safeguards treaty regulations. The camera systems are positioned in strategic locations in facilities such that objective evidence can be obtained for material transactions. The films are then processed, reviewed, and used to substantiate the conclusions that nuclear material has not been diverted. Procedures havemore » been developed to document and aid in: 1) the performance of activities involved in positioning of the camera system; 2) installation of the systems; 3) review and use of the film taken from the cameras.« less