Naval arms control: The opposition
The author observes that hope that naval arms control agreements might bolster Soviet mellowing and inhibit a return to confrontation must be balanced against the likelihood that whether or not the United States negotiates on naval arms control has little real effect on what happens in the Soviet Union and against the undesirability of being pinned down to a less advantageous military position if things go sour. The hope that U.S. willingness to formally limit and reduce American naval capabilities and options would compel the Soviets to reduce even further their potent land-based power on the Eurasian continent or their strategic nuclear power has to be balanced against the possibility that Soviet willingness to make such reductions is driven by factors that have very little to do with the naval relationship between the two nations. Ultimately, then, we are driven back to the dilemma faced by the professional military regarding naval arms control. Without compelling evidence that naval arms control proposals are beneficial in themselves, the author notes we need a clear exposition of how they fit with other negotiations to improve national security and a much better understanding of the role naval arms control negotiations should play in a comprehensive national arms control strategy.
- OSTI ID:
- 6726690
- Journal Information:
- Arms Control Today; (USA), Journal Name: Arms Control Today; (USA) Vol. 20:1; ISSN ACOTE; ISSN 0196-125X
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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