Electric transmission access and pricing policies: Issues and a game-theoretic evaluation

Technical Report · Tue May 01 00:00:00 EDT 1990

OSTI ID:6717732

Kelly, K; Eifert, M ^[1]; Hobbs, B F ^[2]

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1. National Regulatory Research Inst., Columbus, OH (USA)
2. National Regulatory Research Inst., Columbus, OH (USA) Case Western Reserve Univ., Cleveland, OH (USA)

Competition in electric generation has brought increased attention to existing transmission access and pricing policies. New policies have been proposed by several parties (including NRRI). This study summarizes, the various proposals for reform, examines the issues they raise, and offers a way of analyzing the strategic behavior of sellers, wheelers, and buyers of wholesale power as they face new access and pricing rules. Finally, the study applies game theory as a way for regulators to evaluate behaviors and outcomes, both short run and long run. 60 refs., 54 figs., 13 tabs.

• Research Organization: National Regulatory Research Inst., Columbus, OH (USA)
• Sponsoring Organization: NARUC; NRRI
• OSTI ID: 6717732
• Report Number(s): NRRI-90-10; ON: TI90014360
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY
292000 -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Supply
Demand & Forecasting
293000 -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Policy
Legislation
& Regulation
296000* -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Electric Power
CAPACITY
COMPETITION
COST
DECISION MAKING
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
ECONOMICS
ELECTRIC UTILITIES
EVALUATION
FLEXIBILITY
MARKETING
MECHANICAL PROPERTIES
PLANNING
POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS
PRICES
PUBLIC POLICY
PUBLIC UTILITIES
REGULATIONS
SPECIFICATIONS
TENSILE PROPERTIES