Vertical integration, tying, and antitrust policy

Journal Article · Thu Jun 01 04:00:00 EDT 1978 · Am. Econ. Rev.; (United States)

OSTI ID:6713293

Blair, R D ^[1]; Kaserman, D L

---

1. Univ. of Florida, Gainesville

Formal proof is presented of an earlier article (Northwestern Univ. Law Rev., 55; 62-95 (Apr. 1960)) in which Meyer Burstein argued that the variable-proportions incentive for vertical integration has relevance for antitrust enforcement. Burstein's proposition also argued that there are alternatives to vertical integration by tying nonmonopolized inputs. It also implies that the economic effects of vertical integration and tying are identical, which raises the question of why the two are treated differently by present antitrust laws. Both are found to improve downstream production efficiency, although the new welfare effects are ambiguous. 16 references.

• OSTI ID: 6713293
• Journal Information: Am. Econ. Rev.; (United States), Journal Name: Am. Econ. Rev.; (United States) Vol. 68:3; ISSN AERNA
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY
290200* -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Economics & Sociology
293000 -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Policy
Legislation
& Regulation
ANTITRUST REVIEW
COMMERCE
COMPETITION
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
ECONOMIC IMPACT
ECONOMICS
EFFICIENCY
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
GOVERNMENT POLICIES
INDUSTRY
LEGAL ASPECTS
MONOPOLIES
PRODUCTIVITY
SOCIAL IMPACT
VERTICAL INTEGRATION