International Atomic Energy agency use of facility calorimeters for safeguards purposes
The IAEA is performing nuclear materials safeguards on an inventory of pure and scrap plutonium oxide powder materials held in Vault 3 of the Plutonium Finishing Plant at the Hanford Site,Washington State. The IAEA uses qualitative and quantitative techniques (weighing, sampling, and destructive analyses) to verify the presence and quantity of the nuclear materials under safeguards. In contrast, the plant operator generally uses non-destructive plutonium assay based on gamma spectrometry and calorimetry for its most accurate plutonium powder container measurements. Recent results have shown that the operator`s calorimeter system achieves measurement variabilities comparable with, or better than, the destructive analyses, particularly for scrap. The results are achieved more quickly and economically,with less waste and lower radiation exposure and contamination hazard, by calorimetry than by classical destructive analyses.Techniques, including authentication methods, are being jointly developed to permit use of the operator`s calorimeter system for international safeguards purposes. The authentication is to ensure the independence of, and to substantiate the validity of,calorimeter measurements for international safeguards. The authentication methods considered and being developed are discussed.
- Research Organization:
- Westinghouse Hanford Co., Richland, WA (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management, Washington, DC (United States)
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC06-96RL13200
- OSTI ID:
- 657943
- Report Number(s):
- WHC-SA--3040-FP; CONF-960767--; ON: DE98054301; BR: EW7002000
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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