Midgetman: missile in search of a mission

Journal Article · Sat Nov 01 04:00:00 EST 1986 · Bull. At. Sci.; (United States)

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.1986.11459437· OSTI ID:6454930

Walker, P F; Wentworth, J A

The US appears to have a love-hate relationship with mobile missiles. American negotiators unilaterally stated in the 1972 SALT I Offensive Arms Agreement that land-mobile ICMBs were inconsistent with limiting offensive nuclear weapons. And 13 years later, in November 1985, President Reagan surprised some members of his Administration by proposing to the Soviets that there be a ban on mobile missiles. These statements reflect US concern over the added difficulties of real-time verification and targeting of mobile missiles; the possibility that mobile systems would afford geographical and political advantages to the Soviet Union; and the Soviet deployment of the SS-20, SS-24, and SS-25 mobile missiles. But they also depict a policy inconsistency that undermines both arms control negotiations and the Midgetman program. A second major arms control issue with Midgetman, omitted in all studies to date, is the fact that the missile is the US' second new ICBM constructed since SALT II. It therefore violates the 1979 SALT II agreement, which permits only one new ICBM; the US case, this is the MX. Although SALT II remains unratified in Washington, both the Soviet and the American sides had agreed to abide by its terms - at least until President Reagan's anti-SALT statements this year. 26 references.

• Research Organization: Institute for Peace and International Security, Cambridge, MA
• OSTI ID: 6454930
• Journal Information: Bull. At. Sci.; (United States), Journal Name: Bull. At. Sci.; (United States) Vol. 42:9; ISSN BASIA
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

350200* -- Arms Control-- Proliferation-- (1987-)
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
AGREEMENTS
ARMS CONTROL
MILITARY STRATEGY
MISSILES
NORTH AMERICA
SALT TALKS
USA
VIOLATIONS