Economic regulation by state commissions: the case of the electric-utility industry

Thesis/Dissertation · Tue Jan 01 04:00:00 EST 1980

OSTI ID:6330352

Berry, W D

Many of the theories of regulation in economics and political science are attempts to predict and explain how regulators distribute wealth among private groups. Although these theories as an aggregate have pointed toward several key participants in the regulatory process - (1) the regulator, (2) the regulated group, and (3) the public - rarely has the behavior of all these actors been considered in a single coherent theory. It is the central thesis of this dissertation that an explanation of the pattern of the distribution of wealth among private groups requires an analysis of variation in the incentives and goals of these three actors, and in the resources they command. As such, I develop a theory based on a conception of electric-utility regulatory process as involving three key actors: (1) the state regulatory commission, and two private groups - (2) the firms in the regulated electric-utility industry, and (3) the group of consumers of the industry. The theory suggests that the distribution of regulatory benefits between these two private groups can be explained by the goals of these actors, the natures of the incentives of the actors for various types of political activity, and the resources available to the actors. The theory is tested comparatively using multivariate cross-sectional regression analysis with both the regulated firm and the American state as units of analysis.

• OSTI ID: 6330352
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY
290200* -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Economics & Sociology
290600 -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Nuclear Energy
ECONOMIC POLICY
ECONOMICS
ELECTRIC UTILITIES
GOVERNMENT POLICIES
INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
POLITICAL ASPECTS
PUBLIC OPINION
PUBLIC UTILITIES
REGULATIONS
STATE GOVERNMENT