Freeze verification: time for a fresh approach

Journal Article · Sat Jan 01 04:00:00 EST 1983 · Bull. At. Sci.; (United States)

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.1983.11459047· OSTI ID:6319926

Paine, C

The administration's claim that some elements of a comprehensive nuclear freeze are unverifiable does not specify the nature of those elements and whether they represent a real threat to national security if we trusted the USSR to comply. The author contends that clandestine development of new weapons will have little strategic effect since both sides already have total destructive power. The risks of noncompliance are largely political and less than the risks of continued arms buildup. Since the USSR would also want the US to be bound by freeze terms, deterrence would come from mutual benefit. Hardliners argue that cheating is easier in a closed society; that our democracy would tend to relax and the USSR would move ahead with its plans for world domination. The author argues that, over time, a freeze would diminish Soviet confidence in its nuclear war fighting capabilities and that adequate verification is possible with monitoring and warning arrangements. (DCK)

• Research Organization: Federation of American Scientists, Washington, DC
• OSTI ID: 6319926
• Journal Information: Bull. At. Sci.; (United States), Journal Name: Bull. At. Sci.; (United States) Vol. 39:1; ISSN BASIA
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY
290600* -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Nuclear Energy
AGREEMENTS
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS
COMPLIANCE
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
MONITORING
NATIONAL SECURITY
NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
SECURITY
WEAPONS