Nuclear-power-plant design concepts for sabotage protection. Phase 2

Conference · Sat Jan 01 00:00:00 EST 1983

OSTI ID:6312002

Ericson, Jr, D M

This program has examined plant design changes for their impact upon sabotage protection. Given the compartmentalization present in current generation plants similar to SNUPPS and BWR 6 and the level of physical protection assumed in this study, even drastic changes in design don't significantly affect the protection against an external threat. In Phase 2 a systems ranking methodology was developed which can be used in both safety and sabotage studies. Damage control measures can be used in sabotage and accident mitigation. However, it is clear from these studies that to be effective, damage control must use installed equipment, and significant portions of that must be available in a very short time following an incident. Insider protection is a difficult task, requiring the integration of a number of techniques to be effective. Component level vulnerabilities can be reduced by careful design, but they can not be eliminated.

• Research Organization: Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (USA)
• DOE Contract Number: AC04-76DP00789
• OSTI ID: 6312002
• Report Number(s): SAND-83-0851C; CONF-830416-2; ON: DE83009690
• Resource Relation: Conference: American Nuclear Society workshop on power plant security, Savannah, GA, USA, 24 Apr 1983; Other Information: Portions are illegible in microfiche products
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS
BWR TYPE REACTORS
PHYSICAL PROTECTION
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
PWR TYPE REACTORS
ADVERSARIES
DAMAGE
DESIGN
FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
RETROFITTING
SABOTAGE
VULNERABILITY
NUCLEAR FACILITIES
POWER PLANTS
REACTORS
SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
THERMAL POWER PLANTS
WATER COOLED REACTORS
WATER MODERATED REACTORS
220900* - Nuclear Reactor Technology- Reactor Safety