Bridging the gap between first- and second-price auctions with withdrawable winning bids
Technical Report
·
OSTI ID:6311366
This paper formulates and analyzes game-theoretic and decision-theoretic models of auctions in which bidders may submit multiple bids and, perhaps at cost, withdraw bids that are more aggressive than necessary to win. While such withdrawal strategies are currently surreptitious, legitimization would create market mechanisms intermediate between first-price and second-price auctions. We describe a particular auction in which a winning bid was withdrawn and fit one of our models to data from it.
- Research Organization:
- Lawrence Berkeley Lab., CA (USA)
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC03-76SF00098
- OSTI ID:
- 6311366
- Report Number(s):
- LBL-23283; ON: DE87013967
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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