SDI and the arms control process
As head of the US delegation on nuclear and space arms at the Geneva negotiations, Kampelman argues that mutual vulnerability to retaliation may no longer be the best formula for systems as radically different as the East and West. While deterrence remains indispensable to our security, it would be better to base deterrence on an increased ability to deny the aggressor his objectives than on our ability to punish aggression. Citing the Soviet military buildup and research on strategic defenses as justification for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), he emphasizes the SDI is limited to research that is consistent with the Antiballistic Missile Treaty. Deployment of SDI in the future would require negotiation with other members of the Alliance.
- OSTI ID:
- 6309151
- Journal Information:
- Atl. Community Q.; (United States), Journal Name: Atl. Community Q.; (United States) Vol. 23:3; ISSN ACMQD
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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Related Subjects
290600* -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Nuclear Energy
ARMS CONTROL
ASIA
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
EASTERN EUROPE
EUROPE
GOVERNMENT POLICIES
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
NATIONAL DEFENSE
NATO
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
RESEARCH PROGRAMS
SPACE WEAPONS
USSR
WEAPONS