Bushel of wheat for a barrel of oil: can we offset OPEC's gains with a grain cartel

Journal Article · Wed Apr 01 04:00:00 EST 1981 · Fed. Reserve Bank St. Louis Rev.; (United States)

OSTI ID:6306096

Luttrell, C B

Among the proposals for retaliating against OPEC prices and production cuts is a grain cartel that will match a bushel of wheat for a barrel of oil. The concept is not valid, however, because the grain market does not have the particular economic conditions which allow OPEC to succeed. Cartels are able to charge higher prices than a competitive industry, but the profit-maximizing rate of output will be less. A US grain cartel would be ineffective because a rise in prices would only result in increased world production by non-cartel members. A food cartel would also harm less-developed countries and would increase famine. 19 references, 5 tables. (DCK)

• OSTI ID: 6306096
• Journal Information: Fed. Reserve Bank St. Louis Rev.; (United States), Journal Name: Fed. Reserve Bank St. Louis Rev.; (United States) Vol. 63:4; ISSN FRBRD
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

02 PETROLEUM
020700 -- Petroleum-- Economics
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& Business Aspects
29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY
290200 -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Economics & Sociology
294002* -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Petroleum
CARTELS
CEREALS
COMPARATIVE EVALUATIONS
ECONOMIC IMPACT
GRAMINEAE
GRASS
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
MARKET
OIL-EXPORTING COUNTRIES
OPEC
PLANTS
SUPPLY AND DEMAND
TRADE
WHEAT