Skip to main content
U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Scientific and Technical Information

Essays in the regulation of electric utilities

Thesis/Dissertation ·
OSTI ID:6296754
The impact of alternative methods of selecting public utility commissioners and other politically determined variables on three major aspects of privately owned and regulated electric utilities was examined. First, it focuses on the bond ratings of these firms. Second, it examines the profitability of regulated electric utilities by estimating the accounting and conditional internal rates of return. Third, it investigates the overall and inter-group price inequalities that results from differential customer-class pricing schemes. The analysis indicates that elected PUCs significantly increase the probability of lower bond ratings. This implies that the electric utilities under the jurisdiction of elected PUCs incur higher costs in raising capital in the debt market. Other politically determined variables such as automatic fuel adjustment clause, staff size, PUC budget, and the number of commissioners are also significant in influencing bond ratings. The empirical evidence suggests that the method of selecting PUC commissioners is an important determinant of the (conditional) internal rate of return. Electric utilities under elected PUCs earn higher internal rates of return than the firms under appointed PUCs. In contrast, the selection method has no significant influence on the accounting rates of return.
Research Organization:
Alabama Univ., Birmingham (USA)
OSTI ID:
6296754
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English