Separation requirements for protection of high altitude satellites from co-orbital antisatellite weapons
This thesis estimates lower bounds to initial separation distances required for safety of maneuverable, shielded satellites against destruction by pre-deployed, co-orbital, nuclear-armed antisatellite (ASAT) weapons with maneuvering capability. Offensive and defensive designs are constrained by reasonable bounds on cost and mass. For satellites in circular Earth orbit with a radius to twice the geosynchronous radius, the lower bound for thirty minutes of safety after initiation of an attack is found to be on the order of thousands of kilometers. The lower bound is not substantially greater for x-ray lasers than for simple nuclear warheads, except perhaps for very long x-ray lasers. The danger to strategic satellites does not depend on the development of exotic energy-beam weapons, but would arise if reliable command and control (CS) and guidance capabilities for maneuverable ASATs in high orbit were successfully developed. Current ASAT programs in the United States and Soviet Union have included development and testing of limited CS and guidance capabilities. Although neither side is known to presently have an ASAT system capable of attacking high-altitude satellites, the danger to satellites in high orbit from capabilities being currently developed suggests that the danger be addressed in the near future. One approach is to attempt to negotiate an agreement with the Soviet Union on separation rules for objects in high orbit. Separation rules offer the potential for a means of mitigating crisis and arms race instabilities introduced by ASAT weapons.
- Research Organization:
- Carnegie-Mellon Univ., Pittsburgh, PA (USA)
- OSTI ID:
- 6237667
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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