The political economy of trade liberalization and environmental policy

Journal Article · Fri Jan 01 04:00:00 EST 1999 · Southern Economic Journal

DOI:https://doi.org/10.2307/1060812· OSTI ID:6185389

Fredriksson, P G ^[1]

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1. World Bank, Washington, DC (United States) Univ. of Adelaide, South Australia (Australia)

A pressure group model where environmental and industry lobby groups offer political support in return for favorable pollution tax policies is used to explain and predict the equilibrium pollution tax in sectors protected by tariffs. The political economy effects of trade liberalization are investigated. The pollution tax is shown to decrease if the lobbying effort by the environmental lobby decreases more rapidly than by the industry lobby Ceteris paribus. The level of political conflict falls with trade liberalization. Pollution may increase because of a reduction of the pollution tax, and tax revenues may fall simultaneously as pollution increases.

• OSTI ID: 6185389
• Journal Information: Southern Economic Journal, Journal Name: Southern Economic Journal Vol. 65:3; ISSN SECJAR; ISSN 0038-4038
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY
290201* -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Economics-- (1992-)
293000 -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Policy
Legislation
& Regulation
CONTROL
ECONOMIC IMPACT
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
GOVERNMENT POLICIES
INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
POLLUTION CONTROL
SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS
TARIFFS