Externality theory, environmental policy, and the control of toxic pollutants

Thesis/Dissertation · Fri Jan 01 04:00:00 EST 1988

OSTI ID:6169463

Fiorentino, C M

This paper assumes that economic incentives as offered by economists are politically unacceptable, and that accurate estimates of monetized health benefits are not available. A method is then developed to allocate resources to pollution abatement. The model assumes that a pollution control agency is charged with the responsibility of maximizing the benefit of the pollution-control policy. The approach assumes that, as per the observed preferences of legislators, a pollution control policy must include pollution standards rather than rely on economic incentives. By employing estimates of abatement costs over industries along with the pollution control budget and a health-status index, a cost-effective set of industry standards is determined. Once the standards for the relevant industries have been established, an economic incentives scheme can be implemented. The approach is then applied to a retrospective air pollution control problem of Ohio. The model demonstrates that a cost-effective allocation of air-pollution-abatement expenditure could have achieved a 17 to 33% improvement in the benefits of abatement in the period from 1973 to 1977. A second application is to a hypothetical toxic-waste cleanup problem.

• Research Organization: Temple Univ., Philadelphia, PA (USA)
• OSTI ID: 6169463
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY
290300* -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Environment
Health
& Safety
CONTROL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
GOVERNMENT POLICIES
MANAGEMENT
MATERIALS
POLLUTANTS
POLLUTION ABATEMENT
POLLUTION CONTROL
PUBLIC HEALTH
REMEDIAL ACTION
STANDARDS
TOXIC MATERIALS
WASTE MANAGEMENT