A dynamic game of a transboundary pollutant with asymmetric players

Journal Article · Thu Jul 01 00:00:00 EDT 1993 · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management; (United States)

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1993.1022· OSTI ID:6150817

Martin, W E; Patrick, R H; Tolwinski, B ^[1]

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1. Colorado School of Mines, Golden (United States)

Modeling transboundary pollutants in a dynamic game framework provides a foundation for analyzing the impact of various policy options. The focus of this analysis is on the results of a tax/subsidy scheme used to address the transboundary problem of global climate change. A nonzero-sum dynamic game with asymmetric players is used to evaluate the policy impact of the tax/subsidy scheme on the respective player's value functions and strategies as determined by a Nash equilibrium feedback solution. The asymmetry of the players is reflected in their respective attitudes toward global climate change with one player benefiting from the change and the other losing. 17 refs., 5 tabs.

• OSTI ID: 6150817
• Journal Information: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management; (United States), Journal Name: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management; (United States) Vol. 25:1; ISSN 0095-0696; ISSN JEEMDI
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY
290201 -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Economics-- (1992-)
290301* -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Environment
Health
& Safety-- Regional & Global Environmental Aspects-- (1992-)
ASYMMETRY
CLIMATIC CHANGE
COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS
ECONOMETRICS
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
ECONOMICS
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
GAME THEORY
GOVERNMENT POLICIES
MATHEMATICS
POLLUTION
STATISTICS
TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION