Cooperative and non-cooperative discrete differential models of oil pricing and the OPEC cartel
The theoretical purpose of the study is to determine and to compare the oil price paths for different market structures, which include cooperative and non-cooperative discrete differential models of the world oil market. The latter (NCDDMs) includes competitive, monopolistic, and Nash-Cournot markets; whereas, the former consists of a Nash-bargaining model (NBM). The empirical purpose of the study are: 1) to apply the NBM to the world oil market and evaluate the OPEC behavior as a price-maker, 2) to elaborate the implications of oil price rises on OPEC cartel stability, and 3) to show how restrictions on production are allocated among OPEC nations. In the monopolistic and competitive markets, under the assumptions of constant production costs over time and identical discount rates, the study concludes that when the initial monopoly price is higher than (lower than) the initial competitive price, the optimal monopoly price path with increasing (decreasing) oil demand elasticities over time will intersect the optimal competitive price path. Also, the optimal monopoly price path with constant oil demand elasticities over time will continue along and be identical and parallel to the competitive price path, whether the initial monopoly price is equal to or different from the inital competitive price.
- OSTI ID:
- 6138513
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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020700* -- Petroleum-- Economics
Industrial
& Business Aspects
29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY
294002 -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Petroleum
CARTELS
COMPETITION
ECONOMETRICS
ECONOMICS
ENERGY SOURCES
FOSSIL FUELS
FUELS
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
MARKET
MONOPOLIES
OIL-EXPORTING COUNTRIES
OPEC
PETROLEUM
PRICES