Safeguards and security issues during facility transition

Conference · Fri Dec 31 04:00:00 EST 1993

OSTI ID:61359

Smith, M R ^[1]; Zack, N R ^[2]

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1. USDOE Office of Safeguards and Security, Washington, DC (United States)
2. Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States). Safeguards Systems Group

The transition of Department of Energy (DOE) production facilities to those destined for decontamination and decommissioning (D and D) must consider traditional safeguards and security requirements governing nuclear materials. Current DOE safeguards and security policy establishes specific requirements for the removal of facilities and waste from safeguards. However, the current physical security policy does not differentiate the protection of waste from usable materials. Other transition issues include: access of uncleared individuals, positioning security zones, nuclear material holdup, accounting for difficult-to-measure materials, inventory difference and resolution, and radiological/toxicological sabotage. Safeguards and security goals for facility transitioning must provide a workable, efficient and cost-effective system for accounting and protecting nuclear material. In depth protection strategies utilizing combinations of safeguards and security systems should be developed to meet these goals.

• OSTI ID: 61359
• Report Number(s): CONF-930749--
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

05 NUCLEAR FUELS
DECISIONS AND ORDERS
DECOMMISSIONING
IAEA SAFEGUARDS
MATERIAL UNACCOUNTED FOR
NUCLEAR FACILITIES
NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT
RADIOACTIVE WASTES
SAFETY ANALYSIS
SECURITY
TOXIC MATERIALS
US DOE
VULNERABILITY