Frequency of attack and the safeguards and security risk evaluation process. Application of the Analytic Hierarchy Process

Conference · Fri Dec 31 04:00:00 EST 1993

OSTI ID:61345

Pickering, D R ^[1]

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1. Ogden Environmental and Energy Services Co., Fairfax, VA (United States)

Political and fiscal considerations are driving safeguards and security policy changes. Frequent topics of discussion as a means of addressing both cost effectiveness and the perceived reduction in threat to Department of Energy facilities is to change the current valuation of the Frequency of Attack in the ``Conditional risk Equation`` to a value which reflects this low probability of attack. A major premise of this paper is that the low probability of an attack on a nuclear facility in the United States is due to the level of deterrence, mitigation, and prevention of the protection systems, not a lack of adversary interest in nuclear facilities. Though nuclear facilities would seem to be ideal attention getting targets for terrorists, the protection system has a deterrent effect, making them ``hard`` targets, thus lowering the probability that they will be attacked. The purpose of this paper is to present an approach to taking credit for those qualitative protection system elements which effect the probability that an attack will occur against a sensitive facility in the United States. Complex problems such as assessing values to large and multi-faceted protection programs require a rigorous analytical approach. Analytic tools can assist in breaking down large, complex problems into their component parts. The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a methodology which is ideally suited for structuring complex problems such as determining how effective the qualitative protection system elements are against a given adversary type and across a specific path to a target. This approach is rigorous, provides significant detail on the rationale for decisions made, and is flexible in adjusting to changing situations. Examples chosen to demonstrate this rigorous methodology are insider adversary types within the DOE ``Design Basis Threat`` policy.

• OSTI ID: 61345
• Report Number(s): CONF-930749--
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

05 NUCLEAR FUELS
CALCULATION METHODS
EVALUATION
INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS
NUCLEAR FACILITIES
NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT
PHYSICAL PROTECTION
PROBABILISTIC ESTIMATION
RISK ASSESSMENT
SAFEGUARDS
TERRORISM
USA